The existing literature treats the short side (i.e., short selling) and long side of hedge fund trading (i.e., changes in holdings) independently. The two sides, however, complement each other in revealing important economic motivations of trading: opposite changes in short interest and hedge fund holdings are likely to be driven by
Introduction
Hedge funds are known to both buy and short sell stocks on a large scale. Changes in hedge fund holdings and fluctuations in short interest are therefore two facets of the same phenomenon: hedge fund trading.
The literature, however, treats these two variables separately, as if they were independent phenomena. For instance, the short selling literature investigates whether short sellers are informed and whether they can help improve price efficiency (e.g., Senchack and Starks, 1993 , Asquith and Meulbroek, 1995 , Aitken et al., 1998 , Cohen, Diether, and Malloy, 2007 , Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008 , Boehmer and Wu, 2013 , Karpoff and Lou 2010 , Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011 , Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu, 2011 , Akbas et al., 2013 .
The question of whether managers are informed and whether they can deliver superior performance is also at the core of the hedge fund industry (Fung and Hsieh 1997 , Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft 1999 , Agarwal and Naik 2004 , Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov 2004 , Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik 2009 , 2011 , and Aragon and Nanda 2012).
However, a joint consideration of changes in both holdings and short interest has been lacking in the literature. This inattention is surprising because a joint approach would provide unique insights. Consider, for instance, the case in which the aggregate hedge fund ownership increases for a specific stock. While such a "net buy" may be driven by private information that predicts an increase in the stock price, it may also arise because of hedging, e.g., hedge fund managers may use the long position to hedge out the systematic risk of their arbitrage strategy. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that changes in hedge fund ownership may not be informative ex ante (e.g., Griffin and Xu, 2009 ) if the second effect prevails.
Indeed, in the presence of both trading motivations-i.e., hedging and information-driven-findings regarding the informational nature of hedge fund trading can hardly be complete if we focus only on one class of trades.
In this paper, we bridge this gap by proposing a novel approach that jointly considers short selling and hedge fund holdings to differentiate various types of trading motivations. Within the previous example, if short interest decreases over the same period in which the aggregate hedge fund ownership increases, hedge funds as a whole are likely to trade on a positive signal, which we refer to as informed long demand. When the opposite pattern of trading occurs, in which case short interest increases over the same period when hedge fund ownership decreases, the trading reflects informed short demand. By contrast, a simultaneous increase (decrease) in both short interest and hedge fund ownership may occur when hedge funds use both the long and the short sides to form arbitrage portfolios (unwind existing arbitrate positions), which we can loosely define as hedging (unwinding) demand. Given that in the case of hedging and unwinding demands, we cannot identify ex ante the direction of the signal of the hedge funds, if any, it is critical to net them out to properly identify the information dimension of hedge fund trading.
This novel identification strategy allows us to shed new light on the informativeness of hedge fund trading based on both hedge fund 13F filings and short selling information for the complete list of U.S. stocks for the period from 2000 to 2012. We proceed in three steps. In the first step, we rely on the traditional Fama-MacBeth specifications to detect the predictive power of informed demand for out-ofsample abnormal returns. For this purpose, we construct variables that proxy for informed long demand and informed short demand and use them to predict out-of-sample abnormal stock returns.
We find strong evidence that informed long (short) demand is associated with positive (negative) outof-sample abnormal stock returns, suggesting that such demand is indeed informative. 1 The economic magnitude is also highly significant. If we define informed long (short) demand as a dummy variable that takes the value of one when changes in short interests and hedge fund holdings belong to the most positive (negative) quartiles of stocks in the same period, we find that this proxy is related to a 6.6% (-3.2%) annualized abnormal return in the next quarter. In other words, stocks with informed long demand outperform stocks with informed short demand by as much as 9.8% per year. Similarly, if we directly construct portfolios rebalanced at a quarterly frequency that buy/sell stocks with informed long/short demand, the abnormal return over the entire sample period is approximately 10.5% per year.
In the second step, we investigate the potential economic channels through which informed demand achieves its predictive power. For this purpose, we first split the sample into two subgroups based on a list of firm characteristics, including market capitalization, turnover ratio, analyst coverage, and dispersion of analyst forecasts. We then perform the return predictability test for each subsample of stocks.
We find that return predictability is more significant for stocks with high market capitalization, a high turnover ratio, high analyst coverage, and high analyst dispersion. The association with the first three characteristics suggests that our findings are unlikely to be driven by liquidity provision, whereas the association with the last characteristic suggests that some sort of better information processing (e.g., Kim
and Verrecchia 1994; Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg 2012) could play a role in the predictive power of informed demand.
Motivated by this preliminary finding, we further explore the extent to which informed demand can predict firm fundamentals, especially those unexpected by the market. Following Akbas et al. (2013) , we consider various types of proxies for firm fundamentals. The first proxy is the real performance of firms-proxied by return on assets (ROA)-or changes in ROA, where ROA can be either adjusted or unadjusted by industry peers. The second type of proxy is related to the unexpected component of earnings, including standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) and analyst revisions. In addition to examining whether informed demand can forecast firm fundamentals, we also investigate whether informed demand can even predict the market response to unexpected firm-level fundamentals, where such a market response is proxied by the cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcements (CARs).
We find that informed demand has significant forecasting power for all the three types of proxies, suggesting that the savvy traders behind such demand are not only well informed about firm-level financial information (ROA, SUE) but also sufficiently sophisticated to predict the market reaction to firm-level information. These results imply that the predictive power of informed demand may come from the discovery of information about firm fundamentals. They also lend support to our initial intuition that the joint analysis of short selling and hedge fund holding changes is useful for revealing the trading motivations of perhaps the most sophisticated type of investors in the market.
In the last step of our analysis, we investigate a few alternative explanations of this return predictability. We first focus on the relationship between mutual fund flows and informed demand.
Indeed, hedge funds may devise their trades to exploit the impact of mutual fund inflows/outflows on stocks (e.g., Shive and Yun 2013). However, informed long (short) demand seems to be negatively (positively) correlated with mutual fund flows, which is the opposite of what a strategy of riding on the price impact of mutual fund flows would suggest. Another potential alternative explanation is that return predictability compensates for liquidity provision. However, we find that informed short demand is related to neither turnover nor the Amihud liquidity measure. This finding, together with the previous finding that return predictability is more prominent for larger and more liquid stocks, suggests that the return predictability of hedge fund trading is unlikely to be related to liquidity supply.
These results, coupled with the fact that predictability extends not only to the financial performance but also to the fundamental performance of companies, suggest that predictability is directly related to hedge fund managers' better information on the cash flows of companies.
Our paper is closely related to Griffin and Xu (2009) . We extend Griffin and Xu (2009) by proposing that the use of information coming from short selling is necessary to identify informed demand shocks that are otherwise hidden among transactions with various motivations. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose such a joint analysis of short selling and hedge fund holdings and to link it to fundamental stock analysis. Our findings regarding informed demand shed new lights on the informational content of both short sellers (Senchack and Starks, 1993 , Asquith and Meulbroek, 1995 , Aitken et al., 1998 , Cohen, Diether, and Malloy, 2007 , Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008 , Boehmer and Wu, 2013 , Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011 , Akbas et al., 2013 and hedge fund managers (Fung and Hsieh 1997 , Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft 1999 , Agarwal and Naik 2004 , Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov 2004 , Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik 2009 , 2011 , and Aragon and Nanda 2012 .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the data that we employ and the main variables that are constructed for the analysis. Section III presents the main empirical findings. Section IV performs robustness tests. Section V discusses the implications of the findings, and a brief conclusion follows.
II. Data and Construction of the Variables
The data that we use are compiled from various databases. We first retrieve hedge fund holding information from 13F filings from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC (1997), we compute the abnormal performance of a stock, which we refer to as the DGTW-adjusted return, as the return of the stock net of the return of its style benchmark based on its size, book-to-market, and prior-period return characteristics. 5 We then compute the quarterly DGTW-adjusted return for each stock, denoted as 3 , , as the compounded monthly DGTW-adjusted return of the stock in the quarter. We also compute the abnormal return over the one-year horizon in a similar way, which we denote as 12 , .
Next, to construct our main independent variables, we compute short interest, , , as the average monthly dollar value of short interest scaled by the total dollar value of all the outstanding shares of the stock in the month, both of which are obtained from Compustat. Because our hedge fund holding data are for each quarter-end, we use SI at the end of the quarter to extract quarterly changes in short interest. The use of the average short interest within a quarter leads to very similar results. Moreover, because our ultimate goal is to retrieve informed trading from both the long and the short sides of trading at the stock level, we also aggregate hedge fund holdings to compute hedge fund ownership for each stock, which we label , for stock in a given quarter .
We define informed long demand as a dummy variable, , , which takes a value of one when hedge fund ownership increases from quarter − 1 to quarter and when short interest decreases over the same period and takes a value of zero otherwise. That is,
where {. } is an indicator function, and Δ , = , − , −1 and Δ , = , − , −1 denote the changes in hedge fund holdings and short interest, respectively.
Similarly, informed short demand is defined as a dummy variable, ℎ , , which takes a value of one when hedge fund ownership decreases from quarter − 1 to quarter and when short interest increases over the same period and takes a value of zero otherwise, i.e., ℎ , = {Δ , < 0} × {Δ , > 0}.
In addition to informed demand, we also define hedging and unwinding demand as a simultaneous increase and decrease in hedge fund ownership and short interest, denoted as , = {Δ , > 0} × {Δ , > 0} and , = {Δ , < 0} × {Δ , < 0}, respectively. Unwinding demand could be triggered by the need to liquidate existing trading positions to lock in profits or by fire sales. Although hedging demand and unwinding demand are interesting phenomena, a thorough examination of these phenomena is beyond the scope of this paper. Hence, we mainly focus on informed demand and provide only very preliminary analyses for these two variablesmainly as a Placebo test for the informed demand variables.
A second, alternative, way to define informed demand is to sort stocks into terciles according to Δ , or Δ , and to then define informed long (short) demand as a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the stock's Δ , belongs to the top (bottom) tercile and if its Δ , belongs to the bottom (top) tercile and that takes a value of zero otherwise. In other words, informed long demand, for instance, can be defined as the simultaneous occurrence of both the "highest" increase in hedge fund holdings and the highest decrease in short interest, where the "highest" increase or decrease is defined on the basis of tercile values of Δ , and Δ , in a given period. To avoid confusion, we refer to tercile-based informed demand variables as The use of tercile-or quartile-based proxies of informed demand or hedging demand is more capable to focus on trading more likely driven by either profitable information or hedging motivations than the focus on just average trading. In contrast, the previous variables of , and ℎ , defined based on positive or negative changes in short interest and holdings are likely to be more representative as they are defined for more stocks but are likely to involve less profitable information. In our later analysis, therefore, we will mainly rely on , and ℎ , to establish our main results. We will then verify that these results are robust to alternative definitions of informed demand and use quintile-based partitions to illustrate the economic magnitude of return predictability.
We also construct a list of control variables as follows. DIV is the dividend yield calculated as dividends divided by market capitalization; Age is the number of months since the stock first appeared in CRSP; and Price refers to the stock price per share. Turnover is the average stock turnover rate (volume divided by shares outstanding) over the past three months. Vol is the standard deviation of returns over the past 24 months. Finally, SP500 is a dummy equal to 1 for stocks in the S&P 500 index and 0 otherwise.
As indicated in the tables, we use natural log transformations of several of these variables in the regressions to reduce the impact of outliers. Table 1 presents the correlation coefficients of these variables. The most interesting pattern is that abnormal returns are positively associated with informed long demand and are negatively associated with informed short demand. This observation provides some initial support that informed demand could be related to stock returns. Of course, this pattern provides only preliminary and in-sample evidence of such a relation. In the next section, we move on to the out-of-sample return predictability of informed demand.
III. Return Predictability
In this section, we explore whether informed long or short demand can predict out-of-sample abnormal returns. We mainly rely on a multivariate specification, and we provide a portfolio-based analysis to verify the robustness of our findings.
A. Baseline Specifications
We rely on the following baseline Fama-MacBech regression at a quarterly frequency to detect the return predictability of informed demand:
where , +1 refers to the out-of-sample DGTW-adjusted abnormal return of stock accumulated over quarter + 1; , refers to a vector of informed demand variables, including
, and ℎ , in the lagged quarter; and , stacks a list of control variables, including DIV, LgAge, LgPrice, LgTurn, LgVol, and SP500.
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The results are reported in Table 2 . In Panel A, Models (1) to (3) provide the results of the baseline regression on the quarterly return predictability of , and ℎ , . We find that, independently or jointly, , forecasts positive abnormal returns and that ℎ , forecasts negative abnormal returns in the next quarter. The predictive power is highly statistically significant, which is consistent with the idea that these two variables capture the informed demand of hedge fund managers/short sellers.
While this paper focuses on informed demand, Models (4) to (6) Although smaller in magnitude, the economic impact is no less impressive given that the stocks that are covered by such long and short demand are approximately 25% of the stocks in a given period.
A better way to illustrate the economic magnitude is to construct portfolios based on our informed demand variables and then compute the long-term performance based on these portfolios. To implement such a strategy, we long (short) stocks that have substantial informed long (short) demand.
Model (1) in Table 3 provides the results for this empirical strategy. At the beginning of each quarter, we focus on stocks that have the highest informed long (short) demand on the basis of terciles of short interest and hedge fund ownership changes in Panel A and quartiles of short interest and hedge fund ownership changes in Panel B. We report the long-run abnormal return that can be generated by these stocks. The results show that stocks with informed long (short) demand generate significant positive (negative) abnormal returns in the long run and that the difference between these two groups of stocks is highly significant, both statistically and economically. For instance, stocks with quartile-based informed long demand can generate a quarterly DGTW-adjusted return of 2.12% in an equal-weighted portfolio, which translates into an annual return of 8.76%. These stocks outperform those with quartile-based informed short demand by 2.53% per quarter, or 10.5% per year. The magnitude is close to what we obtain from the multivariate analysis. Value-weighted portfolios yield consistent results.
In Models (2) to (4) of Table 3 , we further explore how the return predictability of informed demand decays over time. To do so, we report the average out-of-sample abnormal return that can be generated over two, three, and four quarters after the quarter in which we construct informed demand. Models (2) to (4) report the cumulative DGTW-adjusted return over these longer holding periods. The most important finding is that performance does not reverse in the future: the cumulative return difference between equalweighted long and short portfolios in Panel B, for instance, amounts to 4.54%, 5.25%, and 5.8% over the next two, three, and four quarters, respectively. The first quarter abnormal return is 2.53%, which decays to 2%, 0.7%, and 0.5% in the second, third, and fourth quarters, respectively. The decay in the abnormal return is not accompanied by a price reversal.
The evidence in Table 3 , therefore, is generally consistent with a slow diffusion of information in the market. Of course, the type of information underlying this return predictability is unclear. To address this issue, we will relate informed demand to various types of firm fundamentals.
IV. Informed Demand and Firm Fundamentals
Thus far, our results demonstrate that informed demand retrieved from the joint analysis of short selling and hedge fund holding information has significant forecasting power for out-of-sample stock returns.
The next step is to investigate the channels through which informed demand obtains such predictive power. In this section, therefore, we explore the hypothesis that the source of return predictability for informed demand comes from informed investors' ability to forecast firm fundamentals.
A. Subsample Analysis
We start by splitting our sample into two subgroups based on a list of firm characteristics such as market capitalization, turnover ratio, analyst coverage, and dispersion of analyst forecasts. Splitting the sample into these subgroups allows us to better understand the effect of size and liquidity on return predictability.
We therefore perform the return predictability tests as in Model (3) of Table 2 for each subsample of stocks. Table 4 reports the corresponding regression results. More specifically, Models (1) and (2) apply the baseline specification to the subsamples of firms with small and large market capitalization on the basis of a 50%-50% split. We find that the return predictability of both long and short demand remains significant in the subsample of large firms but that short demand loses its predictive power in small firms. This pattern suggests that return predictability is unlikely to serve as compensation for liquidity provision because, otherwise, we would find stronger return predictability for smaller stocks.
Consistent with this intuition, Models (3) to (8), which tabulate the regression results for stocks with different turnover ratios, analyst coverage, and analyst dispersion, illustrate that the return predictability of both long and short demand remains significant mostly for stocks with high liquidity (i.e., high turnover ratios) and high analyst coverage/dispersion. The findings regarding analyst coverage/dispersion suggests that , and ℎ , appear to be informed even in the presence of analysts, indicating that hedge fund managers are better able to process information than analysts (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia 1994; Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg 2012).
B. Forecasting Firm Fundamentals
We now explore the extent to which informed traders can predict firm fundamentals. In the spirit of Akbas et al. (2013), we explore three types of firm fundamentals. The first type is related to the real performance of firms, proxied by return on assets (ROA) or changes in ROA, adjusted or unadjusted by industry peers. We calculate by dividing the firm's income before extraordinary items by its total assets. Further, we define Δ as the difference between the ROA of the current quarter and the ROA from four quarters earlier (i.e., the same quarter in the previous year to account for seasonality in operating performance), and we define -( -Δ ) as ROA minus its industry mean of the quarter, where industries are defined by the 2-digit SIC codes. We repeat the return predictability regression as specified in equation (1), but we replace the dependent variable out-of-sample abnormal returns with out-of-sample ROA in the 12-month period following the construction of informed demand.
The results are reported in Models (1) to (4) of Table 5 . Across all these specifications, we find that , and ℎ , forecast positive and negative ROA of firms, respectively. The predictive power is again highly significant, which is consistent with the notion that informed demand reflects capable traders' ability to forecast firm fundamentals.
Although ROA reflects the long-term profitability of firms, the financial market typically pays special attention to short-term cash flows such as earnings. Thus, another way to achieve return predictability may be based on the ability of capable investors to process earnings-related information better than the market. Hence, the second proxy is related to the portion of earnings that are unpredicted by the market, , where E i, t is the quarterly earnings (income before extraordinary items) of firm i in quarter t and E i, t-4 is the earnings of quarter t-4. c i, t and  i, t are the time-series mean and standard deviation, respectively, of (E i, t -E i, t-4 ) over the last 8 quarters, with a minimum of four quarters of data required for the observation to be valid. Analyst revision is the change in the consensus analyst earnings estimate, computed as the difference in mean estimates from the previous month divided by the stock price at the end of the previous month.
We also supplement SUE with another important variable that may help us understand the information ability of capable traders, namely, analyst revisions. If informed demand forecasts not only SUE but also analyst revisions, then capable investors behind the demand have the ability to process earnings-related information, and their information advantage would exceed that of analysts. Models (5) and (6) confirm this conjecture: both , and ℎ , exhibit the proper power in predicting positive and negative SUE and analyst revisions, respectively.
Finally, hedge fund managers may also be sufficiently sophisticated to predict the market reaction to firm-level information, which would allow them to benefit from their trading. To explore this channel, we examine whether informed demand forecasts the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around earnings announcements. The dependent variable in this case is constructed as the market-adjusted returns upon the earnings announcement over the [-1, 1] window, where the market is defined as the value-weighted portfolio of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks. We find strong evidence that informed long (short) demand peaks before positive (negative) CARs, confirming that the information-processing ability of the hedge funds allows them to benefit from market reactions.
Overall, the results presented in this section support the working hypothesis that informed demand identified by the joint analysis of short selling and hedge fund ownership changes predicts firm fundamentals above and beyond the ability of the general public. Particularly, the main reason that informed demand predicts returns seems to be that it represents the demand of investors who have information and who trade on fundamentals. To further confirm this intuition, we need to rule out other non-fundamental-related sources of information. We explore such alternative explanations in the next section.
V. Alternative Explanations
We now investigate whether the source of information that generates return predictability is related to other non-fundamental-related sources or reasons. We start by asking whether return predictability is related to information on "dumb money," i.e., the exploitation of mutual fund flows. More specifically, if hedge funds can buy/sell stocks that have large mutual fund inflows/outflows, they may profit from the price impact of the subsequent mutual fund trading that is induced by the inflows/outflows (e.g., Shive
and Yun 2013). We therefore examine the relationship between mutual fund flows and informed demand.
We follow Shive and Yun (2013) and use the quarterly aggregate mutual fund holding changes (scaled by trading volume) to proxy for the flows of capital in and out of a stock. In Table 6 , we examine whether the return predictability associated with informed demand as identified in our paper is related to mutual fund flows. We first relate informed demand to changes in mutual fund holdings in Model (1) and find a negative relationship. That is, informed long (short) demand typically predicts negative (positive) mutual fund holding changes. This finding is not surprising. If mutual funds are generally less informed than hedge funds, hedge funds could lead informed trades and mutual funds may simply supply liquidity to these trades.
The more interesting question is whether informed demand can directly forecast and arbitrage the price impact generated by large and uninformed flows of mutual funds, such as those associated with fire sales (e.g., Coval and Stafford 2007) . To do so, we relate informed demand to large inflows and outflows of mutual funds. 7 In Models (2) and (3), we focus on large inflows and outflows, i.e., the flows with a magnitude in the top 10% of the distribution in each period. In Models (4) and (5), we further examine extremely large flows that belong to the top 5% of the distribution. We find that at the 10% level, informed long (short) demand predicts negative (positive) extreme inflows and positive (negative) large outflows, which is the opposite of what a strategy of riding on the price impact of large flows would predict.
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Another possible explanation for the return predictability of informed demand is liquidity provision.
If
, and ℎ , are related to liquidity supply, i.e., stock purchases (sales) in the presence of selling (buying) pressure, these variables should be associated with a return premium that compensates for liquidity provision. To examine this potential explanation, we regress liquidity measured in different periods-concurrent, next quarter, and next year 9 -on , and ℎ , . We use two different proxies of liquidity, turnover, and the Amihud liquidity measure, 10 and we report the results in Table 7 , Models (1) to (3) for the turnover ratio and Models (4) to (6) for the Amihud liquidity measure.
Models (1) to (3) show that informed long demand reduces concurrent and future liquidity, whereas informed short demand is unrelated to liquidity. The reduction in liquidity, if anything, suggests that informed long demand consumes liquidity rather than supplies liquidity to the market. For Models (4) to (6), we find that informed short demand is still unrelated to liquidity at any horizon but that informed long demand is marginally related to a reduction in liquidity in the concurrent period. Again, informed demand does not seem to supply liquidity to the market. Furthermore, because Amihud liquidity can also be interpreted as a price impact, informed short demand does not seem to even benefit from a price impact;
this conclusion is consistent with our findings from Table 2 .
Overall, these findings fail to support alternative interpretations of predictability that differ from the discovery of information about firm fundamentals.
Conclusion
In this paper, we exploit the information contained in the joint analysis of the long and short sides of hedge fund trading. We propose that opposite changes in short interest and hedge fund holdings are likely driven by information, whereas simultaneous increases (decreases) in short interest and hedge fund holdings are likely motivated by hedging (unwinding) incentives. This intuition allows us to utilize short selling and hedge fund holding information to identify informed long and short demand.
Using this identification strategy, we show that informed demand changes have high predictive power for returns. Further, informed demand predicts out-of-sample firm fundamentals, such as ROA, earnings surprises, analyst revisions, and CARs. By contrast, informed demand does not seem to be driven by mutual fund flows or liquidity provision. These findings suggest that the observed return predictability of informed demand can be explained in terms of the discovery of information about firm fundamentals.
Our results also suggest that short selling and hedge fund holdings complement each other in revealing important trading motivations of informed fund managers. More research that integrates short selling and hedge funds could therefore be fruitful in providing insights into information dissemination and asset price formation in the market. Panel A: Out-of-sample quarterly abnormal return (DGTW-adjusted) regressed on partitioned dp variables DLong by positive/negative changes in long/short positions Panel B: Out-of-sampleannual abnormal return (DGTW-adjusted) regressed on partitioned dp variables dp defined by median values In Panel A, we first independently double sort stocks into terciles based on hedge fund 13F holding changes and short interest changes. We then focus on two portfolios of stocks that have experienced the largest net-long and net-short demand shocks. We then report the annualized DGTW-adjusted return that can be generated by the two portfolios over the entire sample period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . This table applies the baseline regression from Table 2 to subsamples of stocks constructed based on different stock characteristics, including market capitalization, turnover ratio, analyst coverage, and dispersion of analyst forecasts. For each of the characteristics, we split the sample in any given quarter into two subsamples based on the median value. We then apply the baseline regression to each subsample of stocks and tabulate the regression results. The superscripts ***, **, and * refer to the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) This table explores the predictability of net demands on out-of-sample firm fundamentals. In Models (1) to (2), we regress firm ROA or changes in ROA in the following year on net long or short demand changes. Models (3) and (4) further adjust ROA or changes in ROA by the industry average. Models (5) and (6) tabulate the results for similar predictive regressions when the dependent variables are next-period SUE and analyst revisions. Model (7) reports the predictability of the net demand changes for next-period CARs.
(1) This table explores how informed demand reacts to mutual fund flows. In Model (1), we regress quarterly mutual fund holding changes ( ℎ ) on informed demand. Models (2) and (3) explore the relationship between informed demand and extreme mutual fund inflows and outflows, defined as flows within the top 10% of the distribution in terms of magnitude. Models (4) and (5) provide an alternative definition of extreme mutual fund flows, in which we use the top 5% of the distribution to define extreme flows.
(1) (2) (3) (4) This table explores the relationship between liquidity and net demand changes. Models (1) to (3) regress the average turnover ratio of the firm in the concurrent period, the next quarter, and the next year with respect to the demand-change quarter, net demand changes, and a list of control variables. Models (4) to (6) replace the turnover ratio by the Amihud liquidity measure of the corresponding period.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
